Kazakhstan: Reducing Nuclear Dangers, Increasing Global Security. Washington, DC: The Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United States and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2004. Call Number: JZ 5665.K39 2004
Abstract: The gravest danger we face today is the threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The likeliest use of these weapons is by terrorist hands. Preventing the spread and use of these weapons should be the central organizing security principle for the 21st Century. In this challenging security environment, the example of Kazakhstan, which voluntarily renounced the nuclear arsenal it inherited from the Soviet Union, becomes even more timely. During the past decade, Kazakhstan in cooperation with the United States under the Nunn-Lugar Program, has removed the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal from its territory, destroyed its nuclear testing infrastructure and become one of the most effective advocates for disarmament and nonproliferation in the world. Kazakhstan's disarmament in cooperation with the international community could and should serve as a model for other countries that have nuclear ambitions.

Albright, David and Corey Hinderstein. "Unraveling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation Networks." Washington Quarterly (Spring 2005): pp. 111-28. Notes: Available fulltext on Lexis/Nexis.
Abstract: The nuclear nonproliferation regime fared poorly in exposing and halting the operation of the international nuclear smuggling network led by Abdul Qadeer Khan, widely regarded as the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. Revelations about the Khan network have revived support for a variety of reforms, but more extensive improvements to the international nonproliferation regime are required to impede the establishment of new networks and to detect them swiftly if they do emerge. Together with its allies, the U.S. must pursue a wide range of foreign policy, intelligence, nonproliferation, export control, and law enforcement initiatives as well as policies intended to close down nuclear smugglers' access to civilian industries in newly emerging industrial states.

Blechman, Barry M. "Post-Nuclear Strategy." The National Interest (Summer 2005): pp. 86-92.
Notes: Available fulltext on Wilsonweb.
Abstract: President George W. Bush has made reversing the proliferation of nuclear weapons a core element in his foreign policy, but without major and prompt changes in his administration's approach to Iran's and North Korea's nuclear ambitions, he will fail. As a first step, the president should make the fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons an integral part of the country's relations with all foreign countries and attempt to influence other countries' nuclear policies through pressure and suitable rewards. In addition, he should no longer ignore Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and its black market trade in nuclear technology and materials, as was done before with regard to Iran and North Korea. Various threat-scenarios involving the use of weapons of mass destruction are considered.

Bonomo, James L. Suggestions for Strategic Planning for the Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002. Call Number: TK 9023.B65 2002
Abstract: This report describes alternative methods for planning the research activities of the Office of Non-Proliferation Research and Engineering and suggests which of those methods seem particularly appropriate to resolving the specific challenges the Office faces. As such, this report should be of interest not only to those within the Office of Non-Proliferation Research and Engineering but also to anyone responsible for planning similar research programs.

Bunn, Matthew. "Preventing a Nuclear 9/11." Issues in Science and Technology (Winter 2005): pp. 55-62.
Notes: Available fulltext on Wilsonweb.
Abstract: The 9/11 Commission called for a "maximum effort" to keep nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands. The steps described here are initial sketches of such efforts. If the world can muster the will to change its approaches, there remains an excellent chance of preventing a nuclear 9/11. Presidential leadership is the key to accelerating progress on securing nuclear weapons and materials.

Bush, George W. "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction." December 2002. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12WMDStrategy.pdf].
Abstract: Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)---nuclear, biological, and chemical--in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. We must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions. To succeed, we must take full advantage of today's opportunities, including the application of new technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis, the strengthening of alliance relationships, and the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries.

Campbell, Kurt M., et al [eds.]. The Nuclear Tipping Point. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004. Call Number: JZ 5675.N848 2004
Abstract: More than half a century after the advent of the nuclear age, is the world approaching a tipping point that will unleash an epidemic of nuclear proliferation? The Nuclear Tipping Point provides a framework for understanding the myriad factors that shape nuclear policy. Case studies of eight long-term stalwarts of non-proliferation regime---Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and Turkey---flesh out this framework and show how even these countries might be pushed over the edge of a nuclear tipping point.

Cordesman, Anthony H. "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Gulf." September 1, 2000. [http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs,view/id,1742/].
Abstract: Reasons for proliferating outweigh disincentives, and motivation is growing. Arms control regimes harass proliferators without stopping stem and fail to offer non-proliferation security.
Deutch, John M. "A Nuclear Posture for Today." Foreign Affairs (January/February 2005): pp. 49-56.
Abstract: The collapse of the Soviet Union was a dramatic geopolitical shift that should have led to major changes in the nuclear posture of the United States. The policy reviews undertaken by the Clinton administration in 1994 and the Bush administration in 2002, however, led to only minor alterations. As a result, the United States lacks a convincing rationale for its current nuclear force structure and for the policies that guide the management of its nuclear weapons enterprise.

Feinstein, Lee and Anne-Marie Slaughter. "A Duty to Prevent." Foreign Affairs (January/February 2004): pp. 136-50.
Abstract: There is a need for a global security system with a collective "duty to prevent" nations run by rulers without internal checks on their power from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). International action to counter WMD proliferation can take the form of diplomatic pressure incentives, economic measures, or coercive action, although contention will arise over who decides when and how to use force. Given the UN Security Council's propensity for paralysis, alternative ways of enforcement must be considered. The next most legitimate enforcer is the regional body most likely to be affected by the nascent threat, and after that, the next best option would be another regional organization such as NATO, which would have a less direct connection to the targeted state but a sufficiently wide membership to allow serious debate over the exercise of collective duty.

Gottemoeller, Rose. "Cooperative Threat Reduction Beyond Russia." Washington Quarterly (Spring 2005): 99. 145-48. Notes: Available fulltext on Lexis/Nexis.
Abstract: The author discusses how much of a role cooperative threat reduction (CTR) programs can be expected to play in U.S. and Russian non-proliferation policies toward newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union and beyond. She outlines the perspective of the U.S., which originally developed the CTR programs, that of the Russian Federation and the NIS, which were the initial recipients of the programs' funds and efforts, and that of the countries and regions beyond the borders of the NIS to which the program could expand. She contends that the attitudes of key decision makers in all of these countries will decide the potential of the programs to attain new nonproliferation objectives and stresses that, although a tool of great promise, CTR cannot and should not stand alone.

Graham, Thomas. "Strengthening Arms Control." Washington Quarterly (Spring 2000): pp. 183-93.
Notes: Available fulltext on Infotrac.
Abstract: International security and the conduct of war have changed dramatically during the last hundred years, perhaps more than in any previous century. One constant in the second half of this century, however, has been the relationship between international security and nuclear weapons. Throughout the cold war and since, nuclear weapons and arms control have been central components of security discourse and are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. While for much of the cold war, arms control was principally focused on managing the bilateral superpower relationship and capping the arms race, the focus of arms control efforts have broadened to include an increasing number of states and non-state actors. This article examines the continuing relevance as well as the multilateralization of arms control by exploring the prevailing trends in arms control and analyzing its current condition.

Herring, Eric, [ed.] Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction. London, UK: Frank Cass, 2000.
Call Number: JZ 5665.P74 2000
Abstract: The bulk of the literature on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) concentrates on preventing their spread. While that is an important subject, these authors contribute to the literature on preventing their use. A common argument runs through all of their contributions: that, while complacency must be avoided, much of the post-cold war focus among Western governments on the threat posed by (WMD) is excessively alarmist. Beyond this shared ground, the studies are diverse in their approaches and in many of their conclusions.

Joshi, Sharad. "Unilateralism and Multilaterism: Analyzing American Nuclear-Nonproliferation Policy." World Affairs (Spring 2005): pp. 147-62. Notes: Available fulltext on Infotrac.
Abstract: This article examines American non-proliferation policy in terms of its unilateral and multilateral approaches. It argues that in light of changes in the kinds of threats after the cold war, the United States is moving more toward a unilateral approach to non-proliferation. This is not to say that the multilateral way has been abandoned; in fact, it is slowly but steadily being refashioned to accommodate U.S. nonproliferation goals.

Krepon, Michael. "Dominators Rule." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February 2003): pp. 55-60.
Notes: Available fulltext on Wilsonweb.
Abstract: With the cold war a thing of the past, the political struggle in the United State is being fought between "dominators" and "conciliators." The two groups can be quickly caricatured: Dominators are strong on leading by example and refuse to feel guilty about the primacy of American power and the ineffectuality of treaties; conciliators are instinctively protective of treaties and would attempt to devalue weapons of mass destruction by means such as multilateral diplomacy. At present, because of Osama bin Laden, dominators are in control in Washington, and American national security is weighted toward power projection and away from preventative diplomacy. By treating preemption as a doctrine, however, the Bush administration has made it increasingly hard to establish coalitions.

Lennon, Alexander T.J. Contemporary Nuclear Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002.
Call Number: UG 743.C65 2002
Abstract: Presents a wide range of views on traditional nuclear questions recast in the current international environment.

Leventhal, Paul L., et al [eds.] Nuclear Power and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Can We Have One Without the Other? Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2002 Call Number: TK 9145.N8297 2002
Abstract: This book's examination of nuclear power--the need for it and the risks associated with it is highly relevant to the new threat environment posed by highly sophisticated, well-coordinated, and suicidal terrorists dedicated to mass killing. Of immediate concern is the adequacy of protection of nuclear power plants against attacks that could cause widespread and deadly radioactive contamination, and the adequacy of the protection of plutonium separated from the spent fuel of these plants against theft for use in atomic bombs. A longer term concern is the adequacy of the worldwide nuclear non-proliferation regime and, in particular, its ability to ensure that nuclear power and research programs do not serve as a cover for the development of nuclear weapons in additional nations, especially those that support terrorism. These issues have long been of concern to the Nuclear Control Institute, and they are addressed in this book.

Levi, Michael A and Michael E. O'Hanlon. The Future of Arms Control. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005. Call Number: JZ 5687.L48 2005
Abstract: Arms control, once a keystone of American foreign policy, has fallen out of favor with many U.S. policymakers. Yet is needed more than ever, although in a different form. The authors underscore that future arms control must have clear priorities and focus on proliferation of the most dangerous technologies to the most dangerous actors. It must also provide early warning of violations, partly to allow coercive action (and perhaps even military force) to be considered in the event of such violations. Rather than hold out the fanciful prospect of nuclear abolition as an incentive for non-nuclear states to forego nuclear weapons, it should offer security guarantees to a growing collective security community of democratic, peaceful states.

Lugar Richard G. "The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses." June 2005. [http://lugar.senate.gov/reportd/NPSurvey].
Abstract: This study will contribute to the discussion inside and outside of governments about how we can strengthen non-proliferation efforts, improve safeguards around existing weapons and materials, bolster intelligence gathering and interdiction capabilities, and expand international cooperation in dealing with a threat that should deeply concern all governments and people.

Mistry, Dinshaw. Containing Missile Proliferation. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003.
Call Number: JZ 5665.M57 2003
Abstract: Presents both an authoritative analysis of long-range missile programs in emerging military powers and a creative analysis of the role that arms control agreements can play in constraining those programs.

Mosher, David E. and Lowell H. Schwartz. "Excessive Force: Why Russia and U.S. Nuclear Postures Perpetuate cold war Risks." Rand Review (Fall 2003): p. NA.
Abstract: Even though U.S.-Russian relations have improved dramatically to the point where the two countries are no longer enemies, they continue to view each other in nuclear terms. This imbalance in the political and nuclear relations between the two countries not only perpetuates the risks of accidental or unauthorized nuclear use but also fundamentally impedes further improvement in relations. To break this impasse and to bring the nuclear component of the U.S.- Russian relationship into better alignment with the improving political relationship, the authors recommend a "phased" approach that can improve both nuclear safety and the overall bi-national relationship. A phased approach represents the best path for overcoming the inertia of the nuclear establishments while still allowing both countries to maintain nuclear forces for a size and posture appropriate for each stage of an improving relationship.

Mosher, David E. et al. Beyond the Nuclear Shadow. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003.
Call Number: TK 9152.343 2003
Abstract: This study focuses on today's remaining risk of accidental and unauthorized use of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, examining in detail a number of steps the United States and Russia could take (both unilaterally and cooperatively) to reduce the risk and to bring their nuclear postures more in line with current political realities.

Oelrich, Ivan. "Co-operative Threat Reduction: The View from Washington." October 19, 2003. [http://ww.fas.org/main/pu_content_printable.jsp?formAction=156&contentId=375].
Abstract: When the Soviet Union collapsed, ending the cold war, the world became a far less dangerous place. But not all the news was good, especially on the short term. Soviet strategic nuclear weapons had been stationed in three Soviet Republics other than Russia. Was the world suddenly to have three new nuclear powers with untested civilian and military nuclear control? And tactical nuclear weapons might have been deployed in several other former Soviet Republics. What was to become of them, or the chemical and biological weapons formerly under the central control of the Soviet Union? Dr. Ivan Oelrich presented comments on the Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to the IIS Conference in Copenhagen, an ad hoc combination of programs of assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union. The CTR program is extremely broad, ranging from help building safer, tamper-proof rail cars used to transport Russian nuclear warheads to efforts to redesign Russian nuclear reactors so they no longer need highly enriched uranium (HEU).

Parachini, John V. et al. Diversion of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons Expertise From the Former Soviet Union: Understanding an Evolving Problem. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2005.
Call Number: U 793.D58 2005
Abstract: This document offers a structured assessment of the threat of NBC weapons proliferation and examines each of its key components. It examines the countries and individuals that seek to illicitly acquire expertise and sensitive knowledge as well as the institutions and types of individuals who have them. Despite fears that such diversion might occur, the empirical record of documented incidents is comparatively small. Nevertheless, the diversion of even a small number of people or a limited amount of critical information can create a significant security concern for the international community.

Pikayev, Alexander. "The U.S.-EU-Russian Nonproliferation Triangle." February 2005. [http://www.csis.org].
Abstract: On the surface, the war on terrorism has brought the issue of WMD proliferation to the top of the list of national security concerns for the United States, Russia, and the European Union. The potential of a terrorist exploding a nuclear device somewhere in downtown New York, London, Paris, or Moscow heavily influenced decision makers and led them to immediately elevate non-proliferation in their lists and call for stronger international cooperation in the field. However, a broad acceptance of non-proliferation values should not camouflage considerable differences in the interests of these three entities.

Pilat, Joseph F. "Reassessing Security Assurances in a Unipolar World." Washington Quarterly (Spring 2005): pp. 159-70. Notes: Available fulltext on Lexis/Nexis.
Abstract: The writer contends that in a world vastly different from that in which they were originally drafted, security assurances must be reevaluated. As a context for debating the future of security assurances, including their role in the May 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York City, he discusses what security assurances have been offered and their current status, whether these or any other assurances genuinely guarantee security or are merely paper promises, and whether security assurances, or their absence, influence states' decisions to proliferate. He concludes that changes in the international security setting that have raised interest in security assurances may also be making new kinds of security assurances possible and may make them more important as means to tackle the greatest current proliferation threats.

Quester, George H. Nuclear First Strike: Consequences of a Broken Taboo. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. Call Number: U 236.Q47 2006
Abstract: This book is intended to survey the probable consequences if nuclear weapons were to be used again in anger for the first time since the bombing of Nagasaki in 1945. It is a speculative analysis of what the world's likely reactions would be and of what the policy responses of the United States (and the other democracies) perhaps should be to such an awful event.

Rhodes, Richard. "Living With the Bomb." National Geographic (August 2005): pp. 98-113.
Abstract: The safety of the world remains threatened by nuclear weapons. The nuclear bombs that were exploded over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, ended the most destructive war in human history--and altered the face of war forever. Now, eight nations brandish known nuclear arsenals, and around 20 others possess the technology and materials to go nuclear within a year or so if they want. In addition, the breakup of the Soviet Union has placed a massive range of nuclear weapons and materials at risk of theft or clandestine sale to non-state actors, either terrorist organizations or criminal networks. The good news is that the global arsenal of nuclear warheads has shrunk with the fall of the Soviet Union. The bad news is that nations continue to seek them.

Roberts, Brad. "The Road Ahead for Arms Control." Washington Quarterly (Spring 2000): pp. 219-30.
Notes: Available fulltext on Infotrac.
Abstract: The central thesis of this article is that down the arms control road are some big forks. The years ahead are not likely to be business as usual, as these forks are probably closer than many believe. There is little to suggest that the analytical community has either thought through the types of security environments that might be encountered down one path or another. Without a clearer sense of the alternatives, the United States is likely to find it difficult to know which direction to choose when a fork appears. The road ahead consists of three paths. The first is the path to continued strategic reductions. The second is the path to a stronger global treaty regime. The third is the path to restored compliance by noncompliant states. Of course, the paths also intersect. It is therefore useful to explore the synergies among them. This approach helps to bring into better focus the long-term viability of arms control and the basic U.S. strategic choices.

Roxborough, Ian. "Taming the Hydra: WMD: Threat and Strategies." Dissent (Fall 2005): pp. 62-8.
Notes: Available fulltext on Wilsonweb.
Abstract: The writer discusses the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and how best to address this threat. He contends that the solutions proposed by the current Bush administration in the U.S. are frequently irrelevant, ineffective, or counterproductive. He considers which countries and groups may want to use WMD and their purposes in doing so. Furthermore, he identifies the U.S. as one of the biggest obstacles to finding a workable solution, due to its militantly unilateral foreign policy, disparagement of the UN and international treaties, and reflexive resort to arms in crisis situations.

Scheinman, Lawrence. "Disarmament: Have the Five Nuclear Powers Done Enough? (NPT 2005)." Arms Control Today (January-February 2005): pp. 6-11. Notes: Available fulltext on Infotrac.
Abstract: Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) calls on parties to the treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race... and to nuclear disarmament." This article embodies not only a legal understanding but also a political expectation, particularly on the part of the non-nuclear-weapon states that in signing the treaty, abjured acquiring nuclear weapons.

Schwarz, Benjamin. "The Perils of Primacy." Atlantic Monthly (January/February 2006): pp. 33+.
Abstract: The news media and the nation’s leaders have virtually ignored the U.S. threat to the stability of deterrence. For most of the cold war, the mutually assured destruction doctrine ensured that Moscow and Washington constantly and carefully assessed the balance of terror and dedicated huge intellectual energy and funds to recalibrating it in response to even the most minor perceived changes, but today America's nuclear dominance poses a threat to security. The capability of the United States to win a nuclear war means that any change in the nuclear balance itself could cause apparently minor conflicts between countries to intensify quickly. Until a nuclear impasse is restored, Moscow and Beijing will certainly ensure deterrence by spreading out their nuclear forces, decentralizing command-and-control procedures, and effecting "launch on warning" strategies.

Sokolski, Henry. "Taking Proliferation Seriously." Policy Review (October/November 2003 ): pp. 51-64.
Notes: Available fulltext on Wilsonweb
Abstract: It is unclear how America's rejection of mutual assured destruction (MAD) thinking might affect U.S. nuclear weapons policies beyond missile defense. The Bush administration indicated its desire to move away from MAD by departing in 2002 from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, but much more is required if a safer set of nuclear policies is to emerge. America and its allies would have to further reduce their security reliance on forms of nuclear retaliation that entail the killing of large numbers of people, actively contest the idea that all states have a natural right to acquire nuclear weapons, and enforce and tighten current nuclear non-proliferation rules. America, is, however, still pushing international cooperation on advanced fuel cycles and reactors, including proliferation of resistant breeder reactors and reprocessing, a risky civilian effort that is consistent with a MAD-inspired reading of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the need for the free exchange of civilian nuclear technology.

Speier, Richard H. and Brian G. Chow. "Precision-Guided Sanctions." 2000. [http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/rr.04.02/precision.html].
Abstract: Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is vital for international security, and sanctions can be an effective force in this effort. Even critics of sanctions make exceptions for well-designed sanctions. The next step should not be to retreat from sanctions. Rather, it should be to improve and focus them. The world needs effective sanctions, because the world needs alternatives to inaction or war.

Spiers, Edward M. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Prospects for Proliferation. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. Call Number: U 793.S65 2000
Abstract: The ending of the Cold War has fueled fresh concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This book examines the changing pattern both of incentives and disincentives for such proliferation, including the utility of these weapons at state and sub-state levels. It also considers how other states should respond, assessing the achievements and limitations of arms and export controls, the evolving concept of deterrence, the debates about counter-proliferation policies and the problems in developing defenses that will effectively counter an inherently dynamic phenomenon.

Straus, Ira. "Reversing Proliferation." National Interest (Fall 2004): pp. 63-70.
Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: If there is to be an effective and durable non- and counter-proliferation effort, diplomatic gains must be embedded permanently in agreements and institutions. Existing organizations have to be reinforced and supplemented where necessary.

Tucker, Jonathan B. War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare From World War I to Al - Qaeda. New York: Pantheon, 2006. Call Number: UG 447.T83 2006
Abstract: Iraq's use of nerve agents in its war against Iran hastened the negotiation of an international treaty banning the use of chemical weapons which went into effect in 1997. Although the treaty now has more than 175 member-states, Al-Qaeda and related terrorist groups are seeking to acquire nerve agents. In this book the author makes clear that we are at a crossroads that could lead either to the further spread of these weapons or to their ultimate abolition.

U.S. Department of Defense. Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000. Call Number: U 793.A336 2000
Abstract: This report describes DOD actions to make the nuclear, biological, and chemical threat a matter of routine consideration within its organization, activities, and functions and identifies other actions the Department can take to improve implementation of the Initiative. It also examines the actions of the Interagency Counter-Proliferation Program Review Committee to coordinate the research and development programs of DOD, the Department of Energy, and the U.S. intelligence community to identify and eliminate unnecessary duplication.

U.S. Department of State. "Proliferation Security Initiative." May 31, 2003. [www.state.gov/t/np].
Abstract: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global initiative aimed at stopping shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The goal of the PSI is to create a more dynamic, creative, and proactive approach to preventing proliferation to or from nation states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. "Non-proliferation: What You Need to Know About Treasury Restrictions." (June 2005): pp. 1-3.
Abstract: The Treasury Department's office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) implements three distinct sanctions programs designed to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The requirements under each of the programs are different. Each program is described in further detail in this article.

Utgoff, Victor A., [ed.]. The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. Call Number: U 793.C65 2000
Abstract: Presents a variety of perspectives on important policy and strategy problems posed by the continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These problems and their solutions are substantially different from those posed during the cold war, when the United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other with massive arsenals of nuclear weapons.

Warden IV, Herbert N. Overcoming Challenges to the Proliferation Security Initiative. Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. Call Number: JX 1974.7.W27 2004
Notes: Also available at http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/cgisirsi/Thu+07:06:55+PST+2006/ SIRSI/0/518/0/04Sep_Warden.pdf/Cor new_gateway_db=HYPERION
Abstract: A U.S.-led naval operation in October 2003 interdicted a shipment of uranium-enrichment components on-board a German cargo ship traveling from Dubai to Libya. In December 2003, Libya announced it would halt its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs and eliminate its existing stockpiles under international verification and supervision. The George W. Bush administration proclaimed the interdiction a triumph for the newly created Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), an activity which was announced five months earlier to interdict, through the threat or actual use of force, land, sea, and air trafficking of WMD at the earliest possible point. Despite increasing international support, numerous joint exercises, and the successful Libyan intercept, the PSI faces serious legal, intelligence, and operational challenges to sustained effectiveness. This thesis takes a close look at these challenges and considers how they can be overcome. The author concludes that overcoming these challenges will require a multilateral trusted information network to augment secretive bilateral intelligence sharing, a PSI-specific legal umbrella to replace current reliance on only partially applicable international laws and resolutions, and an interoperable, team approach to operations that takes advantage of industry's technological improvements in detection technology and is conscious of air-intercept restrictions.

Watkins, Mel. "Bombs Away? Has the Non-Proliferation Treaty Given the World Nuclear Security--or Just the Illusion of It?" This Magazine (May/June 2003): pp. 12-13. Notes: Available fulltext on Infotrac
Abstract: The author examines our ongoing failure to unbuild the bomb.

Winner, Andrew C. "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction." Washington Quarterly (Spring 2005): pp. 129-43. Notes: Available fulltext on Lexis/Nexis
Abstract: The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has been highly touted as a new counter proliferation measure. Although the concept behind the initiative may be straightforward in its bid to deter or halt the shipment of proliferation-related items to certain states or non-state actors, the details of its implementation entail multiple political, legal, operational, and informational issues. Details are provided of the origins of the PSI; its principles and their application; how the PSI fits into a broader strategy for non-proliferation; the initiative's initial success and future effectiveness; and its rapid expansion and potential for growth.