Barger, Deborah G. "It Is Time to Transform, Not Reform, U.S. Intelligence." SAIS Review : pp. 23-31. Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: Intelligence reform has traditionally been the purview of those outside of the Intelligence Community. Many insiders would argue that intelligence reform efforts have resulted in more regulation and bureaucracy and little, if any, improvement in intelligence performance. To address the challenges that the United States will face in the future, it needs to look forward to transforming intelligence, not backwards at reforming it. The transformation of intelligence, however, will require a three-way partnership among external catalysts who bring new ideas to the table, legislative overseers who support new ideas through funding and legislation, and internal supporters who evaluate and then implement change.

Berkowitz, Bruce D. The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century. New York: Free Press, 2003. Call Number: U 163.B37 2003
Abstract: As Western forces wage war against terrorists and their supporters, The New Face of War explains how they fight and how they will win or lose. There are four key dynamics to the new warfare: asymmetric threats, in which even the strongest armies may suffer from at least one Achilles' heel; information-technology competition, in which advantages in computers and communications are crucial; the race of decision cycles, in which the first opponent to process and react to information effectively is almost certain to win; and network organization, in which fluid arrays of combat forces can spontaneously organize multiple ways to fight any given opponent at any time.

Berkowitz, Bruce D. and Allan E. Goodman. Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000. Call Number: QA 76.9.A25B48 2000
Abstract: This book is, in effect, a manifesto for intelligence in the Information Age. The Information Revolution is also changing how people use information. As a result, organizations such as the intelligence community must change their modi operandi in order to provide it. The Information Revolution is bringing into question many basic principles about how intelligence is "supposed to work." To adapt, the intelligence community must abandon many of these principles, replacing them with a new approach.

Berman, Jerry and Lara Flint. "Guiding Lights: Intelligence Oversight and Control for the Challenge of Terrorism." Criminal Justice Ethics (Winter 2003): pp. 2, 56-58.
Abstract: Asserts that as the U.S. seeks to improve intelligence collection, sharing, and analysis, it is necessary to set reasonable guidelines for the FBI, the CIA, and the new Department of Homeland Security to follow and to enforce these guidelines through judicial and congressional oversight. Such guidelines are as important to the prevention of terrorism as they are to the protection of civil liberties.

Calof, Jonathan L. and William Skinner. "Competitive Intelligence for Managers: A Brave New World." Optimum (Summer 1998): pp. 38+. Notes: Available full text on Infotrac
Abstract: Competitive intelligence (CI), a process, which develops skills in planning, gathering, analyzing and disseminating information, is discussed. CI, an organizational requirement in some countries, works on principles such as being proactive, systematic and detailed. Canadian CI performance elucidates the integration of the CI program in competitive organizations. Recommendations on the use of CI in the new global economy are also given.

Chalk, Peter and William Rosenau. "Confronting ‘The Enemy Within.’" 2004. [http://www.rand.org/publications/MG/MG100/].
Abstract: Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, critics have charged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation, while qualified to investigate terrorist incidents after the fact, is not well equipped enough to adequately gather and assess information to prevent attacks. More Intrinsically, many believe that given a predominant and deeply rooted law enforcement and prosecutorial culture, the bureau may not be able to change operational focus toward dedicated counter terrorism intelligence gathering and analysis. To better inform debate, researchers analyzed the domestic security structures of four allied countries-- the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Australia--weighing both their negative and positive aspects.

Chapman, Bert. Researching National Security and Intelligence Policy. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004. Call Number: UA 23.C5135 2004
Abstract: National security issues are a constant concern in the world today. There is an increased desire to learn more about government policy in this area. This book examines and annotates the rich variety of unclassified print and electronic resources available from the United States and other English-speaking countries.

Codevilla, Angelo M. "U.S. Intelligence: A Losing Proposition." American Spectator (September 2004): pp. 10-16. Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: Conventional wisdom used to be that U.S. Intelligence was the lifeblood of the War on Terror. By 2004 no one contested that intelligence, especially the CIA, was at the heart of policies that had failed to stem terrorism and had turned military victory in Iraq into embarrassment. In fact, U.S. Intelligence in all its functions--collection, quality control (otherwise known as counter intelligence), analysis, and covert action is hindering America's war.

Davidson, Alan. "The New FBI Guidelines and Other Anti-Terrorism Efforts: What Every Librarian Should Know." Newsletter on Intellectual Freedom (September 2002): pp.188-234. Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: This is what the FBI Guidelines changed. They detract from our intelligence gathering capability. It has become clear since September 11 that our intelligence failures are largely not in information collection, but rather in being able to analyze the information we already have. Almost every day, a new revelation comes forward about information that was available to our intelligence agencies before September 11. Agents need better capabilities to "connect the dots," not lower privacy protections. The new guidelines exacerbate the problem by permitting even more information to be collected, about more people, and without addressing the fundamental problem of analysis. The second major problem is the very real risk that we will fall back into a world where the FBI is maintaining dossiers on innocent people, keeping that information for indefinite periods of time without giving individuals a chance to do anything about it. All of this is highly controversial, but the point is that the new guidelines constitute a big change in the way the FBI does business

Davis, Paul K. Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002.
Call Number: U 153.D3797 2002
Abstract: Discusses how the Department of Defense could change its system of analysis to better support capabilities-based planning. It pulls together past work and adds new material on implementation, force transformation, and the economics of choice. The monograph is intended primarily for policymakers and analysts in the Department of Defense and other parts of the U.S. government concerned with defense planning. It may also be of interest to a much broader community because the concept of capabilities-based planning has only recently been emphasized and has not been discussed much in the public literature.

Erard, Michael. "Translation in the Age of Terror." Technology Review (March 2004): pp. 54-60. Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: America's new federal National Virtual Translation Center is attempting to address the intelligence flaws that were revealed by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. There is a well-reported dearth of qualified translators in the intelligence community, but there is also a systematic problem in that, the massive deluge of intelligence gathered by NSA satellites is processed by a federal intelligence-gathering bureaucracy that is both sprawling and balkanized. The writer discusses the ways that the National Translation Center, created in 2001 by the USA Patriot Act, is working to prevent the next terrorist attack by employing technology to leverage--rather than replace--human skills.

Garst, Ronald D. and Max L. Gross. "On Becoming An Intelligence Analyst." Defense Intelligence Journal (Fall 1997): pp. 47-59.
Abstract: Intelligence analysis is the most sophisticated and intellectually demanding activity in the Intelligence Community. One does not become an analyst solely by being appointed to an analytical position nor develop into an analyst after only a few days or even weeks of training. Rather, becoming an effective all-source analyst requires years of rigorous education and on-the-job experience. This article describes that set of talents, skills and personal characteristics required of the successful intelligence analyst.

George, Roger Z. "Fixing the Problem of Analytical Mind-Sets: Alternative Analysis." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (Fall 2004): pp. 385-404.
Abstract: The more expert one becomes, the more firm become one's set of expectations about the world. While these mind-sets can be helpful in sorting through incoming data, they become an Achilles' heel to a professional strategist or intelligence analysis when they become out of date because of new international dynamics. Knowing when a mind-set is becoming obsolete and in need of revision can test the mettle of the best expert.

Gerdes, Louis I., ed. Espionage and Intelligence Gathering. San Diego, CA: Greenhaven Press, 2004. Call Number: JK 468.I6E73 2004
Abstract: Examines issues pertaining to the nature and scope of U.S. Intelligence agencies. Authors also debate the social, legal, and ethical implications of espionage and intelligence-gathering.

Gourley, Robert D. "Intuitive Intelligence." Defense Intelligence Journal (Fall 1997): pp. 61-75.
Abstract: Successful operational intelligence officers have long learned to rely on subtle clues from their subconscious as an aid in rapidly forecasting enemy intentions. But, making rapid assessments with little or no conscious reasoning is a skill most intelligence officers never practice or study until placed in the position of advising operational decision makers. All too frequently by the time an individual becomes skilled in this area it is time to rotate to another assignment, which means the learning curve will have to start again for the next person. This learning curve can and should be shortened. Like most skills, the ability to make intuitive assessments can be improved by practice through vicarious experience. Those who are nominated by the Intelligence Community to advise our operational decision makers should be provided with ample opportunity to refine their ability to make rapid assessments and communicate them clearly with seniors and subordinates.

Hansen, James. "U.S. Intelligence Confronts the Future." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (Winter 2004/2005): pp. 673-709.
Abstract: The United States Intelligence Community stands astride the world, the eyes and ears of the only mega-power, with its hands in space and its feet in the mud. But U.S. Intelligence must immediately readjust and recalibrate if it is to continue to provide a decisive information advantage to policymakers, commanders, and diplomats in the future. Intelligence should be nimble, flexible, and agile. Yet the inescapable fact remains that most of the agencies in the Intelligence Community are under a thumb that is firmly attached to the cold, dead hand of the bean-counting bureaucrat. That fact alone has served to prevent urgent reforms and slow down the mechanism for bringing about change in an era when change is needed most.

Harris, James W. "The Path to Intelligence Reform." USA Today (September 2002): pp. 10-14. Notes: Available fulltext on Wilsonweb
Abstract: The writer discusses the need to reform the U.S. intelligence services in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The size of the threat and the fact that the new terrorist groups bear little resemblance to either conventional armies or state-sponsored terrorist groups ensure that Al Qaeda and its follow-on movements will require innovations in U.S. intelligence. Changes in intelligence gathering, however, must go beyond redrawing the organizational chart and redesigning the chain of command. The writer argues that, among other things, the U.S. intelligence community must break down internal barriers, bolster in-house analysis, and foster individual initiative.

Hitz, Frederick P. and Brian J. Weiss. "Helping the CIA and FBI Connect the Dots in the War on Terror." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (Spring 2004): pp. 1-41.
Abstract: In the wake of the manifest failure of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to adequately share information relating to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the U.S. Congress and the general public have attempted to find ways to remedy this deficiency. Of particular interest is how and why the failure of the FBI and the CIA to "connect the dots" among the clues that existed prior to 9/11 might have come about.

Hollywood, John, et al. Out of the Ordinary. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2004.
Call Number: HV 8080.O97 2004
Abstract: This monograph presents a unique approach to "connecting the dots" in intelligence---selecting and assembling disparate pieces of information to produce a general understanding of a threat. Modeled after key thought processes used by successful and proactive problem solvers to identify potential threats, the schema described in this document identifies out-of-the-ordinary, atypical behavior that is potentially related to terror activity; seeks to understand the behavior by putting it into context; generates and tests hypotheses about what the atypical behavior might mean; and prioritizes the results, focusing analysts' attention on the most significant findings.

Hulnick, Arthur S. Fixing the Spy Machine. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999.
Call Number: JK 468.I6H85 1999
Abstract: A blueprint for improving the intelligence community of the United States, not by dramatically taking it apart and building anew, but by acknowledging its accomplishments over a half-century, incorporating better internal and external communication, balancing investment costs and anticipated results, and fine tuning every member agency's components for greater efficiency and accuracy.

________. Keeping Us Safe: Secret Intelligence and Homeland Security. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004. Call Number: JK 468.I6H86 2004
Abstract: How can the United States guard against a clever unknown enemy while preserving the freedoms it holds dear? It is suggested the United States consider not only new strategies and tactics, but also the need to break down barriers between intelligence agencies and law enforcement.

Hunt, Carl. "Transforming Intelligence: Improving Inference Through Advanced Simulations." American Intelligence Journal (Spring/Summer 2004): pp. 32-44.
Abstract: This paper proposes a modeling and analysis environment called Hypothesis and Evidence Reasoning Modeled by Emergence Simulations (HERMES) to offer perspective and insight in ways to deal with complex decision-making environments and assist commanders in dealing with information overload.

Jaeger, Paul T., et al. "The Impact of the U.S.A. Patriot Act on Collection and Analysis of Personal Information Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act." Government Information Quarterly vol.20, no.3 (2003): pp.295-314.
Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: The collection and analysis of personal information under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has been significantly altered by the U.S.A. Patriot Act, and a proposed enhancement to the Patriot Act would create further changes. This article examines the original intent and scope of FISA, how the Patriot Act has dramatically modified the scope and meaning of FISA, and how the Patriot enhancement, if it were to be enacted into law, would create further significant alterations to FISA. The article explores the impact of these on information policy, especially in terms of the collection and analysis of personal information. The implications of these changes to FISA are examined in terms of a number of sources of personal information, including e-government, electronic and transactional records, and libraries. Finally, this article discusses the difficulty in determining the practical effects of these changes to FISA.

Johnson, Loch K. "Analysis for a New Age." Intelligence and National Security (October 1996): pp. 657-71.
Abstract: Normally, the intelligence analyst will begin with open sources of information, then turn to covert sources in a comprehensive search for the missing parts of the world affairs puzzle he or she has been assigned to solve. The covert or secret information (`intelligence, in the narrow sense of the term) is derived from across the 'ints`: signals intelligence (Sigint), imagery intelligence (Imint), measurements-and-signatures intelligence (Masint), and espionage or human intelligence (Humint). The skillful analyst will rely on the synergism from all these sources to produce a report for policymakers that is as accurate as time and the available information will allow.

Keiser, Barbie E. "Online and Beyond for Competitive Intelligence: Chapter 2." Searcher (January/February 1994): pp.34-35. Notes: Available Full text on Infotrac
Abstract: The purpose of an intelligence program is not merely to collect information. You must organize and analyze the intelligence to prompt your organization to action. This article focuses on how one goes about setting up an intelligence program within an organization and the role the information professional can play in managing the process.

Libicki, Martin C. and Shari Lawrence Pfleeger. "Collecting the Dots: Problem Formulation and Solution Elements." January 2004. [www.rand.org].
Abstract: Across a wide variety of endeavors---from homeland security to foreign intelligence, criminal investigation, public health, and system safety---failure to anticipate disaster has been ascribed to the inability to "connect the dots." This paper argues that to "connect the dots," one must first "collect the dots." All too often, the inability to foresee trouble has come about because pieces of information sit in this or that head. Were they combined, trouble would be easier to foresee, but when each stands alone, no compelling conclusions suggest themselves. This paper investigates some of the barriers to circulating tell tale information and describes some approaches---institutional, social, and technological---that would begin to bring information together in a meaningful way.

Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2003. Call Number: JK 468.I6L65 2003
Abstract: The core of this book is organized along the lines of the intelligence process as practiced by most intelligence enterprises: requirements, collection, analysis, dissemination, and policy. Each of these aspects is discussed in detail in terms of its role, strengths, and problems.

________. "Tribal Tongues: Intelligence Consumers, Intelligence Producers." Washington Quarterly (Winter 1992): pp. 157-69. Notes: Available full text on nexis
Abstract: The relationship between the intelligence consumers (policymakers) and the intelligence producers (analysts) influences the intelligence process within the US intelligence community. The intelligence process starts with the collection of intelligence products and ends with their final consumption. The production and consumption of intelligence as part of the policy process is the net result of disparate behavior between two groups. The intelligence community's organizational behavior is discussed.

Martin, Kate. "Domestic Intelligence and Civil Liberties." SAIS Review (Winter 2004-Spring 2005): pp. 7-21. Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: Since September 11, domestic intelligence authorities and technical capabilities have been expanded to fight terrorism. There are calls to substitute an "intelligence" paradigm for a "law enforcement" paradigm in domestic counter terrorism efforts and proposals to establish a new domestic intelligence agency. While better information and analysis is needed to fight terrorism, there is reason to fear that transforming domestic counter terrorism primarily into an intelligence matter is unlikely to appreciably increase security, but will seriously threaten civil liberties. This article outlines an alternative approach that will serve to obtain the intelligence necessary to prevent catastrophic attacks without compromising civil liberties.

McCarthy, Andrew C. "The Intelligence Mess; How It Happened, What to Do About It." Commentary (April 2004): pp. 11-20. Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: Conventional wisdom has it that the problems within the United States' Intelligence network are ultimately the consequences of the rivalry between the CIA and The FBI, but this may not be entirely accurate. There is no doubt that this rivalry exists, and that its effects can be devastating, but day-to-day cooperation between various agencies, particularly the CIA and the FBI, is considerably better than Americans have been led to believe. In fact, the most serious problems are structural and philosophical, rather than bureaucratic. These have taken more than 40 years to develop, and it would require much more than superficial changes to reverse them, even assuming there was a national inclination to do so.

McCue, Colleen. "Connecting the Dots: Data Mining and Predictive Analytics in Law Enforcement Analysis." Police Chief (October 2003): pp. 115-22.
Abstract: Data mining tools, which were once reserved for large federal agencies and research centers, are now available to enhance decision making and analysis in the state and local law enforcement arena. The Richmond VA Police Department is using data mining and predictive analytics for a variety of law enforcement and intelligence applications.

McCue, Colleen, et al. " Data Mining and Value-Added Analysis." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (November 2003): pp. 1-6.
Abstract: A tool developed by the business community, known as data mining, could enable members of the police force to increase their efficiency in analyzing crime and intelligence data. Data mining is an automated tool that utilizes multiple computational techniques in order to explore and characterize large data sets involving one or more data sources. It helps identify significant, recognizable patterns, trends, and relationships that are difficult to detect using traditional analytical techniques alone. Use of the data mining tool does not require technical proficiency, only expertise in the subject matter being examined; and its application potential includes tactical crime analysis, deployment, risk assessment, behavioral analysis, DNA analysis, homeland security, and Internet/infrastructure protection.

Myburgh, Sue. "Competitive Intelligence: Bridging Organizational Boundaries." Information Management Journal (March/April 2004): pp. 47-55. Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: Competitive Intelligence (CI) has become important for today's organizations because it involves identifying strategic information and making that information available to decision makers. The meaning of CI, the seven basic functions of CI, the five elements of CI management, and the relationship between CI and records and information management are discussed.

National Commission On Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 9/11 Commission Report. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004. Call Number: HV 6432.N38 2004
Abstract: In November 2002 the United States Congress and President George W. Bush established by law the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, also known as the 9/11 Commission. This independent, bipartisan panel was directed to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks, identify lessons learned, and provide recommendations to safeguard against future acts of terrorism. This is the authorized edition of the Commission's final report.

O' Connell, Kevin and Robert R. Tomes. "Keeping the Information Edge." Policy Review (December 2003/ January 2004): pp. 19-37. Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: The United States needs to nurture and reinvigorate the innovation ethos of the intelligence community. Taking this approach in previous eras has underwritten both Americas' leadership role in international security affairs and its ability to prevent conflicts or terrorist attacks at home and overseas. Congress and the Bush administration have to expend political capital to take the lead in pursuing innovation without over politicizing or otherwise biasing the process.

Peters, Ralph. "Intelligence Failures and the Limits of Logic." Parameters (Spring 1987): pp. 43-50.
Abstract: The best analysts rarely stand up and state categorically that such and such will definitely happen just so. Rather, they "wargame" various options, some of which must be highly imaginative if we are to receive good value for our efforts. Even this process can degenerate into a form of playing it safe; deluging the decision maker with a list of every possible option, thereby abdicating all real responsibility. But at its best, this earnest pursuit of tomorrow's deepest secrets can become an intellectual endeavor worthy of our nation. And we will always get some of it wrong. This essential realization can be positively liberating to the analyst struggling to mature in a suffocating closed system. We will always get some of it wrong. So let us do our best to get as much of it right as possible, recognizing that much remains unpredictable, except by lucky guess, in a world where a single bullet still has the power to alter the course of nations.

Ronczkowski, Michael R. Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime: Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Investigations. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2004.
Call Number: HV 8079.H38R66 2004
Abstract: Provides a framework for exploring the issues that all new or existing analysts and investigators must face, including what information to gather, how to analyze it, and the effectiveness of crime analysts investigating terrorism.

Ronczkowski, Michael R. and Maria Jose. "The Robbery Clearinghouse: Successful Real-Time Intelligence Analysis." Police Chief (September 1999): pp.28-30.
Abstract: The mission of the clearinghouse is not to directly solve investigations, but rather to provide a foundation of intelligence and assistance to investigators, prosecutors and law enforcement agencies country-wide, thus expanding multi-jurisdictional awareness of robbery trends, bringing investigators together to share viable leads.

Russell, Kevin. "The Subjectivity of Intelligence Analysis and Implications for the U.S. National Security Strategy." SAIS Review (Winter/Spring 2004): pp.147-63.
Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: The language used to describe intelligence estimates as objective reflections of available evidence has led in some cases to a misunderstanding of the role of intelligence in supporting the decision to go to war in Iraq. Saying that the estimate that identified the threats was either "right” or "wrong" ignores the probabilistic nature of intelligence assessments and the necessary subjective elements that make them useful to policymakers. By making this clear in the case of Iraq, we can separate the crucial question of how policy should be decided in the face of increased uncertainty and even more elusive enemies than have been faced in the past. Only then does it make sense to say how intelligence can be made more useful, leaving behind the misguided question of whether the intelligence community was right or wrong on Iraq.

Russell, Richard L. "Intelligence Failures: The Wrong Model for the War on Terror." Policy Review (February/March 2004): pp. 61-72. Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: The U.S. intelligence community's failure to disrupt the conspiracy of September 11, 2001, and its weak performance in assessing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs highlight the risks to security and the demands for strategic intelligence today. Currently, intelligence agencies are bureaucratically modeled after the management structures and hierarchies of the blue-chip companies of old, but whereas the market eliminates noncompetitive firms from the private sector, noncompetitive organizations are perpetuated by inertia in the public sector. Intelligence agencies need to be transformed into nimble, bottom-up, flat, and networked organizations that thrive in the age of information technology. Indeed, America must reforge its obsolescent intelligence community if it is to address transnational threats to U.S. security and traditional threats stemming from nation-states. Ways of reforming the beleaguered intelligence community are discussed.

Schulhofer, Stephen J. The Enemy Within: Intelligence Gathering, Law Enforcement, and Civil Liberties in the Wake of September 11. New York: Century Foundation Press, 2002. Call Number: JC 599.U5S3855 2002
Abstract: Much of this report is devoted simply to describing the new domestic intelligence-gathering and law enforcement efforts. Though this account is based on publicly available information, much of what is technically "available"---in the fine print of new statutes, regulations, and reports---is not at all well known. An important first step in public understanding is simply to see the breadth and implications of the new measures being put in place.

Schum, David A. "Marshaling Thoughts and Evidence During Fact Investigation." South Texas Law Review (Summer 1999): pp.401-+. Notes: Available full text on Westlaw
Abstract: We can organize our thoughts and evidence in many ways; some will be more useful than others. It might seem that the study of marshaling or organizational activities is neither challenging nor exciting. This would be true if what we are organizing are things like the clothes in our closets or books on shelves, for our convenience. But the marshaling of thoughts and evidence in inference tasks has far greater importance than mere convenience. Thoughts and evidence organized or juxtaposed in one way can lead to significant insights that do not flash before us when these same thoughts and evidence are organized in other ways. How we marshal our thoughts and evidence has an important bearing on the discovery process itself as well as on the process of drawing conclusions from what we have generated or discovered.

Spangler, William E., et al. "Choosing Data-Mining Methods for Multiple Classification: Representational and Performance Measurement Implications for Decision Support." Journal of Management Information Systems (Summer 1999): pp. 37-62. Notes: Available full text on Wilsonweb
Abstract: This research explores the less-tractable problems of multiple classifications in data mining, wherein a single observation may be classified into more than one category. Because multiple classification is a significant aspect of numerous managerial tasks--including, among others, diagnosis, auditing, and scheduling--understanding the effectiveness of data mining methods in multiple classification situations has important implications for the use of information systems for knowledge-based decision support.

The Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis. "Sherman Kent's Final Thoughts on Analyst-Policymaker Relations." June 2003.
Abstract: Sherman Kent, widely recognized as the single most influential contributor to the analytic doctrine and tradecraft practiced in CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, was long seized with the importance, and difficulty, of establishing effective relationships between intelligence analysts and policy officials. Kent experienced frustrations as well as successes with what he saw as the central professional challenge of simultaneous service to two demanding masters, analytic integrity and policy clients.

Thomson, Anne. Critical Reasoning. London: Routledge, 2002. Call Number: B 609.2.T48 2002
Abstract: Critical reasoning is centrally concerned with giving reasons for one's beliefs and actions, analyzing and evaluating one's own and other people's reasoning, devising and constructing better reasoning. Common to these activities are certain distinct skills, for example, recognizing reasons and conclusions, recognizing unstated assumptions, drawing conclusions, appraising evidence and evaluating statements, judging whether conclusions are warranted; and underlying all of these skills is the ability to use language with clarity and discrimination.

U.S. Department of Justice. Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: The FBI's Counter terrorism Program Since September 2001 . Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2004.
Call Number: J 1.114/2:2004021455
Abstract: The attacks of September 11, 2001, highlighted the need to develop an intelligence process for the Counter terrorism Program and the rest of the Bureau. Since then, the Bureau has undertaken to build the capacity to fuse, analyze, and disseminate its terrorism-related intelligence, and to direct investigation activities based on its analysis of gaps in its collection against national intelligence requirements.

Wheatley, Caroline N., (ed.) Focus On Intelligence Issues. New York: Nova Science, 2004. Call Number: JK 468.I6F63 2004
Abstract: The U.S. Intelligence Community continues to adjust to the 21st Century environment. In the post-Cold War world, terrorism, narcotics trafficking and related money laundering are perceived both as criminal matters and as threats to the nation's security. Priority continues to be placed on intelligence support to military operations and on involvement in efforts to combat transnational threats, especially international terrorism. Growing concerns about transnational threats are leading to increasingly close cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This book presents well thought-out analyses of the most urgent issues in the intelligence community.

Williams, Phil and Roy Godson. "Anticipating Organized and Transnational Crime." Crime Law & Social Change (June 2002): pp. 311-55. Notes: Available full text on Criminal Justice Periodicals (CJPI)
Abstract: This paper seeks to identify ways in which governments and law enforcement agencies might enhance the effectiveness of their efforts to anticipate organized crime. Underlying indicators provide warnings about future manifestations of organized crime. Anticipating these manifestations provides a basis for appropriate preventive, defensive or mitigating strategies. Finally the article provides some examples of specific techniques of information collection and intelligence analysis that might assist in this task of anticipation.

Wright, Larry. Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Analytical Reading and Reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Call Number: B 809.2.W75 2001
Abstract: This book provides a vocabulary that allows readers to articulate the central patterns found in human reasoning and in expository writing. The project of this text will be to increase our articulateness about reasoning and to do so in a way that helps us bring our understanding to bear on it.